Rebuilding Europe’s Defence Industrial Base

The return of large-scale war to Europe has exposed the fragility of the continent’s defence industrial base and its structural dependence on a globalized economy optimized for efficiency rather than endurance. For three decades, Europe treated armaments production as a residual function of the Cold War, sustained only through limited procurement cycles and technological prestige projects.

The sudden need for sustained supply to Ukraine revealed that stockpiles were shallow, production lines mothballed, and coordination among member states minimal. European industries could not match the pace of consumption imposed by high-intensity warfare.

This analysis answers: What is the central argument of “Rebuilding Europe’s Defence Industrial Base”, and why does it matter for European defence and dual-use markets? What does this mean for European defence funding, procurement and investment decisions? How mature and defensible is the position described in “Rebuilding Europe’s Defence Industrial Base”? Which European actors, programmes and funding instruments are most exposed?