Capability
Layered Air Defence Architecture (Operational Priorities)
What defines a layered air defence architecture as a distinct operational line of effort against the full spectrum of aerial threats?
Layered Air Defence Architecture (Operational Priorities): The emergence of a layered air defence. Defence-finance analysis; 30-page sourced DFM PDF report.
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Original DFM publication · DFM Analysis report · 2025-12-13
The emergence of a layered air defence architecture as a distinct operational line of effort reflects the urgent need to counter a full spectrum of aerial threats in a unified and multilayered manner. In NATO’s current strategic environment, Russia’s use of advanced missiles and drones has underscored severe vulnerabilities in Europe’s air defences .
Alliance leaders have explicitly identified integrated air and missile defence as key to credible deterrence, especially after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine shattered assumptions about the security of NATO airspace .
This analysis answers: What defines a layered air defence architecture as a distinct operational line of effort against the full spectrum of aerial threats? How do sensors, interceptors and command-and-control layers interact to counter Russian missiles and drones in a unified, multilayered manner? Which actors, capability families and industrial-base bottlenecks shape integrated air and missile defence for NATO? What readiness, force-posture and roadmap measures are needed to make layered air defence a credible deterrent?
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Layered Air Defence Architecture (Operational Priorities)
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Layered Air Defence Architecture (Operational Priorities)
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