Counter-UAS as a Structural Layer of Integrated Air and Missile Defence

Counter-UAS capability is no longer a peripheral force-protection function but a structural requirement within integrated air and missile defence. The operational failure it addresses is the persistence of an unmanaged low-altitude airspace in which large numbers of small, low-signature unmanned systems can operate with relative freedom, eroding surveillance, cueing fires, and degrading command-and-control resilience.

As NATO and the European Union adapt their air defence postures to saturation tactics, hybrid pressure, and contested electromagnetic environments, counter-UAS must be integrated as a layered, networked component of the broader IAMD construct.

This analysis answers: Why is counter-UAS now a structural requirement within integrated air and missile defence rather than a peripheral force-protection function? How do system architecture, components and integration dependencies bind counter-UAS into layered, networked IAMD? Which technology-stack clusters, industrial base and value-chain actors underpin counter-UAS, and where are the bottlenecks? What performance thresholds and implications for companies, research and capital actors follow from saturation and contested-spectrum tactics?