Structural Bottlenecks in Europe’s Quest for Strategic Autonomy

Europe’s rearmament is now defined less by procurement targets and more by the bottlenecks that determine what can actually be produced, when, and at what scale. Across the continent, pressures on explosive materials, propellants, missile components, microelectronics and specialised manufacturing capacity have revealed how thin the industrial base has become after decades of contraction.

These constraints have practical implications for timelines, output levels and the broader debate on readiness and autonomy. The war in Ukraine has simply accelerated a reality that was already emerging: strategic intent is constrained at each step by the weakest link in the supply chain.

This analysis answers: What industrial bottlenecks (explosives, propellants, missile components, microelectronics, specialised manufacturing) constrain Europe's rearmament? How do these supply-chain constraints determine what can actually be produced, when and at what scale? Which weakest links in the supply chain most limit strategic intent, and which actors are affected? What implications do these bottlenecks hold for timelines, readiness and strategic autonomy?