Capability
Strategic Communications Operational
Strategic Communications Operational: what is at stake for Europe's space and communications resilience?
“Strategic Communications” has emerged as a dedicated operational priority to secure the information domain against adversary manipulation and to project a unified narrative of Allied intent.
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Original DFM publication · DFM Analysis report · 2023-07-11
“Strategic Communications” has emerged as a dedicated operational priority to secure the information domain against adversary manipulation and to project a unified narrative of Allied intent. Within the broader strategic priority of Information Superiority & Counter-Hybrid Threats , it addresses the growing threat of hostile information operations – including state-sponsored disinformation, propaganda and influence campaigns – that seek to destabilise societies and erode the credibility of the Alliance [1] [2] . This line of effort translates high-level intent (the commitment to truthful, values-based messaging) into a coherent set of missions focused on shaping the information environment in peace, crisis and war.
Its purpose is to ensure that NATO and EU nations can proactively communicate accurate information, counter false narratives and reinforce public resilience, thereby denying adversaries the ability to “divide and conquer” through information warfare [3] [4] . The need for robust strategic communications is explicitly recognized in foundational strategic documents adopted after 2014 and especially following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept identifies malign information activities by strategic competitors (Russia’s and China’s disinformation, for example) as a direct threat to Alliance security, and commits NATO to “strengthen its strategic communications” as part of credible deterrence [5] [6] .
Similarly, the EU’s Strategic Compass (2022) calls for enhanced tools to counter hybrid threats “including in the information sphere” and stresses coordination with NATO on strategic communications messaging [7] [8] . At the political level, Allied leaders have repeatedly underscored this priority: the 2023 Vilnius Summit communiqué noted tangible progress in fighting disinformation and countering hybrid threats through improved strategic communications in NATO-EU cooperation [9] . These strategic texts reflect a post-2018 consensus that controlling the narrative and exposing malign influence are integral to collective defense and societal resilience.
Key takeaways
- Similarly, the EU’s Strategic Compass (2022) calls for enhanced tools to counter hybrid threats “including in the information sphere” and stresses coordination with NATO on strategic communications messaging [7] [8] .
- NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept identifies malign information activities by strategic competitors (Russia’s and China’s disinformation, for example) as a direct threat to Alliance security…
- At the political level, Allied leaders have repeatedly underscored this priority: the 2023 Vilnius Summit communiqué noted tangible progress in fighting disinformation and countering hybrid threats through improved…
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Original DFM analysis
Strategic Communications Operational
FAQ
What is Strategic Communications Operational?
Its purpose is to ensure that NATO and EU nations can proactively communicate accurate information, counter false narratives and reinforce public resilience…
Why does Strategic Communications Operational matter for European defence?
The need for robust strategic communications is explicitly recognized in foundational strategic documents adopted after 2014 and especially following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
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