Joint Procurement & Industrial Integration (Operational Priorities)

The return of large-scale, high-intensity war to Europe has exposed the strategic importance of defence industrial capacity as a foundation of credible deterrence. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 demonstrated that advanced weapons alone are not sufficient – sustained conflict hinges on having deep reserves of ammunition, explosives and spare components to maintain operations over time .

Early in the war, Russian industry surged output to levels far beyond Europe’s peacetime production, creating a dangerous gap. By early 2024, Russia’s war economy was reportedly manufacturing as many artillery shells in three months as NATO Europe produced in an entire year .

This analysis answers: Why has defence industrial capacity, including deep reserves of ammunition, explosives and spare components, become foundational to credible European deterrence? How does the gap between Russian wartime output and NATO Europe's peacetime artillery-shell production expose structural bottlenecks in the value chain? Which industrial actors, capability families and force-posture requirements shape joint procurement and industrial integration? What roadmap, financing and industrial-base measures are needed to sustain high-intensity operations over time?