Israel, Iran, And The Limits Of Liberal Deterrence

The ongoing confrontation between liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes has become the main axis along which the international order is being redefined. This is not an abstract ideological clash, but a concrete struggle between political systems, economic models, and opposing worldviews, where the stakes involve the ability of states to autonomously determine their political choices, ensure institutional security, and safeguard civil liberties. In this context, the reluctance of liberal democracies to resort to the use of force—even when vital interests are at stake—constitutes a structural weakness.

Prudence, when not supported by a credible deterrence strategy, may be interpreted by adversaries as indecision or withdrawal. Israel, in its recent targeted strike on Iranian nuclear infrastructure, acted on the basis of a threat perceived as both existential and immediate. The Iranian regime is a revisionist actor that has never abandoned its strategic objective of acquiring latent nuclear capability.

As an ally of Russia and China, Tehran has demonstrated a willingness to supply arms to Russian forces engaged in Ukraine, directly challenging the Euro-Atlantic security framework. Iran’s nuclear program, nominally civilian, has developed alongside the country’s growing influence in the Levant and the Gulf through armed non-state actors, fostering permanent instability in key regions. Israel’s decision to strike strategic Iranian targets highlights a responsibility that other international actors have chosen to avoid.

Western democracies, though fully aware of the risks posed by a nuclear-capable Iran, have preferred an approach of strategic patience based on multilateral diplomacy and control mechanisms that have proven insufficient. Israel acted preemptively to prevent an authoritarian regime—one that supports anti-Western armed groups—from acquiring an irreversible strategic asset. This decision reflects not only a national security imperative, but also the recognition that in certain circumstances, credible deterrence entails calibrated use of force.