European Undersea Cable Protection Capability

Europe’s undersea cables, energy interconnectors and seabed infrastructure were designed as civilian, commercial and regulated networks, but the sequence of incidents in the Baltic Sea since 2022 has moved them into the centre of NATO and EU security planning.

The damage to Nord Stream, Balticconnector, Estlink 2 and associated data cables has shown that infrastructure linking electricity markets, gas systems and digital connectivity can become a strategic vulnerability without fitting neatly into traditional categories of war, sabotage, accident or commercial disruption.

This analysis answers: What is the scope of Europe's undersea cable, energy interconnector and seabed infrastructure protection challenge revealed by Baltic incidents since 2022? How do NATO's Baltic Sentry and the EU Action Plan on Cable Security interact to build an operational protection architecture? Which actors, legal/regulatory frameworks and capability gaps (including the attribution problem) shape the emerging cable-protection market? What surveillance, repair and public-private governance measures are needed to operationalise European cable security through 2026?